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https://github.com/silverstripe/silverstripe-framework
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365 lines
17 KiB
Markdown
365 lines
17 KiB
Markdown
# 2.4.4 (2010-12-21)
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## Overview
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* Security: SQL information disclosure in MySQLDatabase
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* Security: XSS in controller handling for missing actions
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* Security: SQL injection with Translatable extension enabled
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* Security: Version number information disclosure
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* Security: Weak entropy in tokens for CSRF protection, autologin, "forgot password" emails and password salts
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* Security: HTTP referer leakage on Security/changepassword
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* Security: CSRF protection bypassed when handling form action requests through controller
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* Improved security of PHPSESSID and byPassStaticCache cookies (setting them to 'httpOnly')
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## Upgrading Notes
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### If you're using open_basedir in PHP:
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There is a bug in 2.4.4 which breaks open_basedir restriction.
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The issue has been fixed in the development 2.4 branch, but you'll need to patch your existing copy of SilverStripe
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2.4.4 if this affects you. The error usually occurs when you try logging into the CMS.
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It can be fixed by patching your working copy with this change: http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/115314
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### Security: SQL information disclosure in MySQLDatabase
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#### Description
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The 'showqueries' GET parameter shows all performed SQL queries in the page output.
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This is intended functionality, but should be limited websites not being in "live mode"
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(set through Director::set_environment_type(), checked through Director::isLive()).
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By adding an 'ajax' GET parameter you can circumvent this live check.
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See Secunia Advisory: http://secunia.com/advisories/42346/
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#### Solution
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Don't circumvent Director::isLive() check in MySQLDatabase
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#### Impact
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Information disclosure of potentially sensitive information through SQL query strings.
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#### Reported by
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Andrew Lord, Nathaniel McHugh
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#### Patches
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* trunk: http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114782
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* 2.4: http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114783
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### Security: XSS in controller handling for missing actions
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#### Description
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Controller routing in SilverStripe core doesn't encode
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error messages for missing URL actions before returning
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them to the user (see Controller->handleAction()).
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This can be reproduced with any URL that doesn't
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have custom error handling defined through RequestHandler::$url_handlers,
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which includes all core controllers.
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Reproduce with the following URL:
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`http://`<your-host>`/Security/%3Cvideo%20src=1%20onerror=%22alert%281%29%22%3E;;`
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See Secunia Advisory: http://secunia.com/advisories/42346/
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#### Solution
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Force Content-Type: text/plain upon output.
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#### Impact
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Attackers can craft URLs to change the displayed website behaviour
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as well as gain access to authenticated cookie information.
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In case the victim has a permanent login cookie ("Remember me" checkbox),
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this can lead to CMS access for attackers.
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#### Reported by
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Tim Suter, Andrew Horton (http://security-assessment.com)
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#### Patches
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* trunk: http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114444
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* 2.4: http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114751
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### Security: SQL injection with Translatable extension enabled
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#### Description
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Locale setter methods on i18n and Translatable classes are not sanitizing or whitelisting input,
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which can lead to SQL injection based on "locale" GET parameters. This behaviour
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is limited to websites having the (built-in) Translatable extension activated.
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#### Solution
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Sanitize locale values in Translatable->augmentSQL() and whitelist
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locale values in i18n setters.
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#### Impact
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High
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#### Affected Versions
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* SilverStripe trunk
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* SilverStripe 2.4.3 or older
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* SilverStripe 2.3.9 or older
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#### Provided by
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Pavol Ondras
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#### Patches
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* trunk: http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114515
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* 2.4: http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114516
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* 2.3: http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114517
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### Security: Version number information disclosure
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SilverStripe exposes version information through
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static files located in the webroot. As these files
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have no extension, they are served without processing
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by most webserver default configurations.
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The files are:
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sapphire/silverstripe_version
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cms/silverstripe_version
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See http://open.silverstripe.org/ticket/5031
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See http://secunia.com/advisories/42346/
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#### Solution
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Reject web requests to version information through .htaccess for Apache, and web.config for IIS.
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#### Impact
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Version Information about the product can be used to craft attacks more specifically.
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#### Reported by
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Robert Mac Neil
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#### Patches
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* trunk: http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114774 http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114770
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* 2.4: http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114774 http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114771
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* 2.3: http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114776 http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114772
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### Security: Weak entropy in tokens for CSRF protection, autologin, "forgot password" emails and password salts
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SilverStripe uses rand(), mt_rand() in combination with
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uniqid(), substr() and time() to create pseudo-random tokens.
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Due to the nature of these implementations, the entropy
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of tokens is low, potentially exposing them to brute force attacks.
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Affected functionality:
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* CSRF form protection
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* Member Autologin
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* "Forgot Password" emails
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* Autogenerated salt values for hashed passwords in the Member table
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#### Solution
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Use the best available PRNG implementation on the current platform
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and PHP version (favouring MCRYPT_DEV_URANDOM and openssl_random_pseudo_bytes()).
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#### Impact
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Weak entropy can be used for more successful brute force attacks.
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#### Reported by
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Andrew Horton (http://security-assessment.com)
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#### Patches
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* trunk: http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114497 http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114498
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http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114503 http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114504
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http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114505
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* 2.4: http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114499 http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114500
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http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114506 http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114507
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* 2.3: http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114501 http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114502
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http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114509
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### Security: HTTP referer leakage on Security/changepassword
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#### Description
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The Security/changepassword URL action can be invoked with a temporary
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token stored against the member record ("AutoLoginHash"). This token is set
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when a member requests a new password by email through Security/lostpassword,
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and cleared upon successful password change.
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The token is passed as a GET parameter, which can expose it to HTTP referer
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leakage, in case the member decides to navigate away from the "change password" form
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before submitting the form (which would invalidate the token).
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If the clicked link is an external page, the (still valid) GET parameter will appear
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in the external site's HTTP referer logs, enabling third parties to take over
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user accounts.
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Note: This is only a problem when Security/changepassword is used without being logged-in.
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#### Solution
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Redirect from Security/changepassword/?h=XXX to Security/changepassword
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and store the token in session instead.
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#### Impact
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Takeover of user accounts by third parties with access to HTTP referer logs.
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#### Provided By
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Andrew Lord
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#### Patches
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* trunk: http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114758
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* 2.4: http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114760
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* 2.3: http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/114763
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### Security: CSRF protection bypassed when handling form action requests through controller
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#### Description
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The built-in CSRF protection on forms in SilverStripe can be bypassed
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by routing the action through the controller instead of the form.
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Protected: mycontroller/MyForm/?action_doSubmit=1
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Unprotected: mycontroller/action_doSubmit
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Note: Does not apply to manual CSRF protection in controller actions
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through SecurityToken->check().
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#### Solution
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Developers are encouraged to use Controller::$allowed_actions to limit the
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actions accessible through URL routing. Methods that need automatic CSRF
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protection (most form actions) should NOT be included in $allowed_actions,
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their protection is handled through request handling in the form class itself.
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See [security](/developer_guides/controllers/access_control/#allowed-actions) documentation for more details.
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#### Impact
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Exposes various administrative actions (creating a new page, reverting to draft)
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to CSRF attacks, in case attackers know the URL a victim has a valid CMS login for.
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#### Provided By
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Ingo Schommer
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#### Patches
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* trunk: http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/115182 http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/115185
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* 2.4: http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/115189 http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/115188
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* 2.3: http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/115200 http://open.silverstripe.org/changeset/115191
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## Changelog
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### Features and Enhancements
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* [rev:114901] Allow setting secure session cookies when using SSL. Recent change r114567 made this impossible. (thanks simon_w!) (from r114900)
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* [rev:114572] 'bypassStaticCache' cookie set in Versioned is limited to httpOnly flag (no access by JS) to improve clientside security (from r114568)
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* [rev:114571] Session::start() forces PHPSESSID cookies to be httpOnly (no access by JS) to improve clientside security (from r114567)
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* [rev:114499] Added !RandomGenerator for more secure CRSF tokens etc. (from r114497)
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* [rev:114467] PHP requirements in installer now check for date.timezone correctly being set for PHP 5.3.0+. This option is *required* to be set starting with 5.3.0 and will cause an error during installation if not
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* [rev:114083] Added SS_HTTPResponse->setStatusDescription() as equivalent to setStatusCode(). Added documentation.
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* [rev:113963] Split temp directory check and writability into two checks
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* [rev:113961] #6206 Installer additional checks for module existence by checking _config.php exists, in addition to the directory
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* [rev:113919] Allowing i18nTextCollector to discover entities in templates stored in themes/ directory (thanks nlou) (from r113918)
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* [rev:113871] Update Asset's left and right panels with filders and files after 'Look for new files' was triggered (open #5543)
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### API Changes
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* [rev:114474] Using i18n::validate_locale() in various Translatable methods to ensure the locale exists (as defined through i18n::$allowed_locales) (from r114470)
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### Bugfixes
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* [rev:115189] Removing form actions from $allowed_actions in !AssetAdmin, CMSMain, !LeftAndMain - handled through Form->httpSubmission() (from r115185)
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* [rev:115188] Checking for existence of !FormAction in Form->httpSubmission() to avoid bypassing $allowed_actions definitions in controllers containing this form
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* [rev:115188] Checking for $allowed_actions in Form class, through Form->httpSubmission() (from r115182)
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* [rev:115169] Fixed conflicting check of mysite directory with recommendation of removal of _config.php in installer
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* [rev:114941] #6162 CMSMain::publishall() fails when over 30 pages (thanks natmchugh!) (from r114940)
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* [rev:114922] #6219 Director::direct() validation fails for doubly nested file fields (thanks ajshort!) (from r114921)
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* [rev:114823] Installer should check asp_tags is disabled, as it can cause issues with !SilverStripe
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* [rev:114783] Removed switch in !MySQLDatabase->query() to directly echo queries with 'showqueries' parameter when request is called via ajax (from r114782)
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* [rev:114774] Disallow web access to sapphire/silverstripe_version to avoid information leakage (from r114773)
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* [rev:114771] Disallow web access to cms/silverstripe_version to avoid information leakage (from r114770)
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* [rev:114760] Avoid potential referer leaking in Security->changepassword() form by storing Member->!AutoLoginHash in session instead of 'h' GET parameter (from r114758)
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* [rev:114719] Fallback text for "Password" in !ConfirmedPasswordField when no translation found
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* [rev:114683] Populates the page with fake data in order to pass subsequent unit tests
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* [rev:114654] Test if form is the right class (if a class decorates the content controller, this test would break ie sphinx)
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* [rev:114516] Escaping $locale values in Translatable->augmentSQL() in addition to the i18n::validate_locale() input validation (from r114515)
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* [rev:114512] Limiting usage of mcrypt_create_iv() in !RandomGenerator->generateEntropy() to *nix platforms to avoid fatal errors (specically in IIS) (from r114510)
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* [rev:114507] Using !RandomGenerator class in Member->logIn(), Member->autoLogin() and Member->generateAutologinHash() for better randomization of tokens. Increased VARCHAR length of '!RememberLoginToken' and '!AutoLoginHash' fields to 1024 characters to support longer token strings. (from r114504)
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* [rev:114506] Using !RandomGenerator class in !PasswordEncryptor->salt() (from r114503)
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* [rev:114500] Using !RandomGenerator class in !SecurityToken->generate() for more random tokens
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* [rev:114473] Check for valid locale in i18n::set_locale()/set_default_locale()/include_locale_file()/include_by_locale() (as defined in i18n::$allowed_locales). Implicitly sanitizes the data for usage in controllers. (from r114469)
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* [rev:114445] Don't allow HTML formatting in !RequestHandler->httpError() by sending "Content-Type: text/plain" response headers. (from r114444)
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* [rev:114208] Including template /lang folders in i18n::include_by_locale() (implementation started in r113919)
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* [rev:114195] Added !SecurityToken to !PageCommentInterface->!DeleteAllLink() (fixes #6223, thanks Pigeon)
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* [rev:114083] Strip newlines and carriage returns from SS_HTTPResponse->getStatusDescription() (fixes #6222, thanks mattclegg) (from r114082)
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* [rev:114081] Removed double quoting of $where parameter in Translatable::get_existing_content_languages() (fixes #6203, thanks cloph) (from r114080)
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* [rev:114036] Fixed case where !AssetAdmin would throw an error if $links was not an object in !AssetAdmin::getCustomFieldsFor()
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* [rev:113976] #6201 Use of set_include_path() did not always include sapphire paths in some environments
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* [rev:113962] Installer now checks temporary directory is writable, in addition to it being available.
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* [rev:113809] #6197 simon_w: Fixed Internal Server Error when accessing assets on Apache without mod_php.
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* [rev:113692] Avoid reloading CMS form twice after certain saving actions (fixes #5451, thanks muzdowski)
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### Minor changes
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* [rev:114916] Ensure php5-required.html template shows correct minimum and recommended PHP versions (thanks mattcleg!) (from r114915)
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* [rev:114751] Setting Content-Type to text/plain in various error responses for !RestfulServer (from r114750)
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* [rev:114749] Reverting Member "!AutoLoginHash", "!RememberLoginToken" and "Salt" to their original VARCHAR length to avoid problems with invalidated hashes due to shorter field length (from r114748)
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* [rev:114745] Partially reverted r114744
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* [rev:114744] Reduced VARCHAR length from 1024 to 40 bytes, which fits the sha1 hashes created by !RandomGenerator. 1024 bytes caused problems with index lengths on MySQL (from r114743)
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* [rev:114720] Code formatting change in !ConfirmedPasswordField::__construct()
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* [rev:114454] Added exception handling if !ClassName is null in search results
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* [rev:114334] Checking for class_exists() before !SapphireTest::is_running_tests() to avoid including the whole testing framework, and triggering PHPUnit to run a performance-intensive directory traversal for coverage file blacklists (from r114332)
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* [rev:114079] Reverted r108515
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* [rev:114078] Documentation for Aggregate caching (from r114077)
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* [rev:114062] fixed visual glitch in CMS access tab for IE
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* [rev:114036] Defined $backlinks as an array before adding entries to it
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* [rev:114016] Fixed php tag in !SecurityTokenTest, should be "<?php" not "<?"
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* [rev:113984] Installer now writes "!SetEnv HTTP_MOD_REWRITE On" in .htaccess to be consistent with the original .htaccess file that comes with the phpinstaller project
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* [rev:113968] Fixed PHP strict standard where non-variables cannot be passed by reference
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* [rev:113967] Fixed undefined variable $groupList
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* [rev:113964] Re-use variable instead of check temp folder again
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* [rev:113956] Make sure that Translatable creates a translated parent of !SiteTree only when the parent is not translated (from r113955)
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* [rev:113937] don't trigger notice but Debug::show it
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* [rev:113936] don't trigger notice but Debug::show it
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* [rev:113933] test doesn't fail anymore due to time differences between db and php. The test now issues notices, warnings and errors depending on the severity of the offset
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* [rev:113924] Fixed spaces with tabs in Core
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* [rev:113923] Fixed spaces with tabs for Core::getTempFolder()
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* [rev:113696] call jquery-ui from thirdparty folder instead google api (see ticket 5915) (from r113656)
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* [rev:113695] Typo in !AssetAdmin (fixes #6191, thanks Juanitou)
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* [rev:113690] Updated cs_CZ and sk_SK translations in sapphire/javascript (fixes #6085, thanks Pike)
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* [rev:113689] Making some !JavaScript strings in cms/javascript translatable, and updated their cs_CZ and sk_SK translations (fixes #6085, thanks Pike)
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### Other
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* [rev:114464] FIX: Revert last commit
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* [rev:114463] FIX: Revert last commit
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