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3.0.4 changelog update
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* Security: Information leakage through web access on YAML configuration files
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* Security: Information leakage through web access on composer files
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* Security: Require ADMIN permissions for `?showtemplate=1`
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* Security: Reflected XSS in custom date/time formats in admin/security
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* Security: Stored XSS in the "New Group" dialog
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* Security: Reflected XSS in CMS status messages
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* Changed `dev/tests/setdb` and `dev/tests/startsession` from session to cookie storage.
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## Details
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### Security: Prevent web access to YAML and composer files
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### Security: Information exposure through web access on YAML configuration files
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Severity: Moderate
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@ -52,6 +55,47 @@ which might expose some of the internal template logic.
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## Upgrading
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### Security: Reflected XSS in custom date/time formats in admin/security
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Severity: Low
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Prerequisite: An attacker must have access to the admin interface.
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Description: When creating a new user on the security page
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(Security->New User) within the admin interface, the user input
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is not properly validated and not encoded. A reflected XSS is
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possible within the `DateFormat_custom` and `TimeFormat_custom` fields.
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Credits: Andreas Hunkeler (Compass Security AG, http://www.csnc.ch)
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### Security: Stored XSS in the "New Group" dialog
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Severity: Low
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Prerequisite: An attacker must have access to the admin interface.
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Description: There is a stored XSS vulnerability on the "group" tab on the
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security page in the admin interface
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(Security -> Groups -> New Group). It's possible to store a
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XSS within the group name. Everywhere where these group names
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are used, the XSS is executed. E.g. "New User" or "New Group".
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Credits: Andreas Hunkeler (Compass Security AG, http://www.csnc.ch)
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### Security: XSS in CMS status messages
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Severity: Low
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Prerequisite: An attacker must have access to the admin interface.
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Description: Any data returned to CMS status messages (Growl-style popovers on top right)
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was not escaped, allowing XSS e.g. when publishing a page with
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a specifically crafted "Title" field.
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Credits: Andreas Hunkeler (Compass Security AG, http://www.csnc.ch)
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### Misc
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* If you are using `dev/tests/setdb` and `dev/tests/startsession`,
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you'll need to configure a secure token in order to encrypt the cookie value:
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Simply run `sake dev/generatesecuretoken` and add the resulting code to your `mysite/_config.php`.
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